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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-v-
CARYL. LENZING, Case No. /9091 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of Attemnted Criminal 
Homicide, a Second Degree Felony; Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree 
Felony; and Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Class B Mis-
demenaor, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
DA''ID 1:1ILKINSON 
;..llornc" General 
:;r-3te Capitol Building 
Solt Citv, Utah 84114 
•rncv for Respondent 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rHE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
,)r,Y L LENZING, Case No. /C/OC// 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of Attempted Criminal 
a Second Degree Felony; Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree 
Felonv; and Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Class B His-
in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
' 0 •mty, State of Utah, the Honorable Horner F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
ncesiJin2. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
CARY L. LENZ ING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. /9DC// 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, CARYL. LENZING, appeals from the conviction 
judgment of Attempted Criminal Homicide, a Second Degree Felony; 
Agsravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony; and Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial 
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, oresiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant, CARYL. LENZINr,, was tried and convicted of 
'Lernpted Criminal Homicide, a Second Degree Felony; Aggravated 
·' ' ''" 1 :1. a Fi rs t Degree Felony; and Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
a Class B Misdemeanor; on March 2, 1983. Appellant was 
c:ctenced that same day to the indeterminate term of not less than 
1w1 rnure than 15 years at the Utah State Prison for the crime of 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, the indeterminate term of nor 'e" 
than 5 vears nor more than life at the l!tah State Prison for ·-, 
crime of Aggravated Robberv, and the indeterminate term of rt. 
0 to 6 months at the Utah State Prison for the crime of CH, iu· 
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon. Such sentences to run concurren· _ 
RELIEF sour.HT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reverals of the juJgment rendered b:.· 
Court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS' 
On November 9, 1982, at aoproximately 7:25 p.m., South 
Salt Lake City Police Personnel were dispatched to a transient 
area located near the railroad tracks at 3000 South 500 \.Jest, ,. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, where a transient named Hi lliam S. South:·· 
advised police that he and another transient.who were returnin£ 
their hobo camp from Salt Lake City, after having sold blood, ': 
another transient, Jack P. Hillard, lving on the ground bleedin 
Mr. Hillard was attended to bv paramedics and then transferred: 
the emergency room at St. Mark's Hospital. Officer Lee Lindsc 
South Salt Lake Police Department, made an inspection of the a> 
surrounding cir. Hillard's camo. At aporoximatelv 3350 South 
West, Officer Lindsy observed another hobo camo and maJe conn. 
with the Appellant and two other transient indi\'ir'ual s "1ti :e 
questing identii-ication from them the llffice1· ,>hse:·"eJ d ,-reec 
pack on an alurr1in1m f1·ame :·1hich he l-i.1.J been .1,l\-i ''"'' 11 • h: 
f:-ienJ appea1·ec tci be "1issinv f1·,,n his :m.l the ·1,·1 t • .1··p 
' abc»:11 the ownership of the pack, the Appellant, without the 
,,,- warnings, advised the Officer that the nack 
, ,I t:• him. Officer Lindsy then noticed what appeared to be 
:)11 r-he coat of the Appellant and a knife being carried on 
,,, underneath the waist-length jacket. The Appellant was 
iced under arrest and the knife, back pack, and clothing of 
, '1e :".pre llan t were D laced in to evidence. The Aonel lan t, as we 11 
, ' the ocher members of his camp, appeared to have been extremely 
-11-,xicated; Mr. Brown, another transient, being so intoxicated 
he passed out after providing the officers with identifica-
Also taken into custody was the third member of Anpellant's 
ca,1p, a Mr. Stevens, who stated that the blood on the Appellant's 
:uot came from a dog bite which had been sustained by the Anoel-
0
dnt earlier in the day. 
At trial, Mr. Hillard testified that drinking, as well as 
celling blood, was a way of life of transient persons, and that 
1e and Appellant, as well as other residents of the hobo camn 
e,.-ce ,!rinking heavily on that day. He testified that he recalled 
'':e Appellant and the Appellant's friends being together in 
:Ls camp and that he was, without provocation, attacked and 
bv the Appellant. 
ARGUME'IT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUB!!IT'T'ED BY THE 
STATE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED 
CRI>IINAL HOMICIDE \.nlERE THE EVIDENCE OF VOL!J'l-
TARY INTOXICATION OF THE APPELLAfH WAS SO P!'.:R-
1'.\SI\'E AS TO '.-!EGATE THE REl/UIRED STA'T'lJTOPY 
I:ITENT FOR THAT OFFENSE. 
-3-
Utah Code Annotated, §76-2-306 (1953 as amended) state.: 
in pertinent part, "voluntary intoxication shall not be a defo·oc 
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication nep,ates the exi" 
ence of the mental state which is an element of the offense 
This court has stated that, "voluntary intoxication of a suff' 
cient degree may destroy a person's ability to form the necesk 
specific intent to commit a particular crime requiring a specif,. 
intent." (citation omitted.) State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 11' 
(Ut. 1983). In that case the court found that the appellant 1.; 00 
not so intoxicated as to negate his intent to break into the 
pharmacy and steal drugs. 
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Ut. 1982), a murder case, 
this court considered whether the trial court had erred in rest'.: 
ing the intoxication evidence to the day of the crime and a fe..· 
prior thereto and refusing to give an intoxication instruction. 
court stated that, "intoxication per se is not a defense to a 
criminal charge," at 39, but that if the crime charged requi:· 
specific intent, the intoxication may negate the intent. Theref: 
in a homicide case, " [ i) f intoxication is so great as to negate,. 
existence of a necessary specific intent for first degree murder 
the crime is reduced to second degree murder." ( citations omi:> 
Id. at 90. 
The Appellant in the case at bar was charged and con'-
11 ,, 
of Attempted Criminal Homicide, snecificallv that he "in tPnt 
" 
or knowingly attempted to cause the death of Jack P. Hillac· 
(Information). The crime with which the Appellant was char£<'.' 
convicted required specific intent. There was evidence 
-4-
rial to indicate that the Appellant was so intoxicated at 
,irne of the incident that he could not have formed the required 
.- 11 1 Uhen he arrived at Hillard's camp, he was carrying a 
! cl" 1Jhic h was practically empty (T. SS) . There was testimony 
_.,at the Appellant's partner was so drunk that he had to lie doi;.m 
and to sleep (T. S8). One of the Officers investigating the 
inci,ient testified that the Appellant had an odor of alcohol about 
!iirn, and that in his experience, transients who live in the area 
Jhere the incident occurred frequently drink a great deal (T.120-
lcl). There was also testimony that after being stabbed twice, Mr. 
:111 lard said to the Appellant, "What are you trying to do, kill me?" 
(T.68). The Appellant made no answer. This cannot be viewed as 
rhe reasonable response of a sober individual. 
Voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal behavior 
but may negate "the existence of the state of mind required for 
the commission of the crime, (and) the act or omission which other-
·""ise 1Jould constitute an offense is purged of its criminality." 
Stdte v. Potter, 627 P.2d 7S, 70 (Ut. 1981). In this case, the 
e•·idr::nce indicates that the Appellant was not able to form the 
cequisite intent to murder the victim necessary to meet the stat-
utory requirements of Attempted Criminal Homicide. Based on this 
nabilitv to form the intent necessary to commit Attempted Criminal 
Hur.iicide, the Appellant's conviction cannot stand. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO 
SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF ACiGRAVATED 
ROBBERY. 
-S-
The Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Robberv 
travention of Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-302 (1953 as anende.: 
That statute reads: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robberv if in the 
course of committing robbery, he· 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a deadly weapon, or 
(b) Causes serious bodilv injurv upon another 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first 
degree. 
(3) For the purposes o: this oart, an act shall 
be deemed to be 'in the course of committing a 
robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the ilTil'1ediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
The robbery statute, Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-301 (1953 as a-,-
states; "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of ner, -
property in the possession of anotl-ier from his person, or iffil'le· 
presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or •, 
The elements that must be proved, then, for Aggravatec 
Robbery are: 1) that there was an intentional taking of person" 
propertv, 2) that the property was in the victim's possession 
that the taking was from the victim's person or immediate preY 
4) that the taking was against the will of the owner; 5) that : 
taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 6) 
during the course of committing the robbery, the person uses c 
arm, knife, deadly weapon, or facisimile thereof, or causes 0 " 
bodily injurv upon another. The evidence oresented at tri;il 
not establish each of these necessary elements. 
Assumin£., arl'.uendo, that the rrreen backnacl· lounJ in 
possession of the Appellant belonged to Hillard and thar 
Appellant had, in fact, taken the hackf'3Ck ,1nJ assumint' 
-h-
'1 1, simple robbery much less Aggravated Robbery. 'lo evi-
;nesented during trial to indicate when the backpack 
: ,·n 0r that the taking and the stabbing were in any way 
[vidence showed that Mr. Hillard had a green backoack 
,, he kept inside his shandv (T. 74) .. Mr. Hillard testified 
,1 lie did not see the Appellant take his backpack (T. 76). Mr. 
,r 1.wrth, Hillard's partner, testified that he had seen the 
r-he morning of the incident before he left to sell his 
·1.•s",a. and that he realized that it was missing after the stabb-
in, incident (T. 91). He was not present, however, when the 
s 1bbing took place and could not testify as to when the pack 
t have been taken (T. 89). Additionally, there was no testi-
. 1'n' that any blood was found on the backpack. Blood was found 
.:i the Appellant's jacket and on his knife (T. 238), and it 
"Jiu be reasonable to assume that if the backpack had been taken 
e'er the stabbing, there would have been blood found on that 
•s •.,•e 11 . 
While Utah's statute does not require that the force 
ccc,sdrv to constitute a robbery either precede or be contem-
,. 1r;e,1us with the taking of the property, as do some states, 
c State v. Aldershaf, 556 P.2d 371 (Kan. 1976), and Smith v. 
':, J78 P.2d 790 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963)), there still must 
iclationship between the taking and the use of force or 
In the present case, no relationship between the two 
·c1H·cs was established. If robbery was not established, 
"ed [,obbery could not have been. 
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The standard for reversing a conviction due to insuf-
ficiency of evidence was most recently articulated by this coun 
in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Ut. 1982). In that c&e, the 
court overturned a second degree murder conviction saying 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant corrrrnitted the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
Id. at 444. 
In this case, there was testimony that Appellant stabbed Mr 
Hillard, There was testimony that Mr. Hillard owned a green baci· 
pack. There was also testimony that the Appellant had the back-
pack in his possession after the stabbing. There was no evidenCE 
however, regarding when the backpack was taken or that the takin· 
and the stabbing were in any way related. 
Because the State failed to establish even the requirec 
elements of robbery, Aggravated Robbery could not have been 
proved. The evidence does not show the required link between 
use of force and the taking and so a conviction for robbery coul 
not stand. Absent a showing that there was a robbery, the con-
viction for Aggravated Robbery cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence presented at trial indicated that at the time 
that the stabbing took place the Appellant was intoxicated. ·· 
Attempted Criminal Homicide is a crime requirine snecific inte· 
the Appellant contends that at the time of the stabbing he wa> 
-8-
, 0 intoxicated to be able to form the required intent and so 
t-icJ1.ilJ not have been convicted of attempted criminal homicide. 
Ti 1e ,;·Ii clence was also insufficient to sustain the Appellant's 
conviction for Aggravated Robbery. No evidence was presented 
bv the State which connected the disappearance of the backpack 
Lo the stabbing. Without some link, there can be no robbery, 
and clearly no Aggravated Robbery, and this conviction cannot 
sta'<n 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16ay 1984. 
BROOKE C . WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, this 
_._'_ day of 1984. 
/1 ,/ 
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